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TheBehavior of Yields and Terms on
Conventional, FHA and VA Mortgages
The relationship between different mortgage yield series is examined
in this chapter. A comparison of yields on FHA and conventional
mortgages illuminates some features of lender preference associated
with the characteristics of these loans, especially those concerning risk.
A comparison of FHA and VA yields reveals the influence of the
contract rates that prevailed at different times on these loans. Com-
parison of yield series covering direct, correspondent and secondary
market transactions reveals the influence of different types of market
organization. We also examine the relationship of cyclical changes in
mortgage yields to loan-value ratios and maturities on the same type
of mortgage.
Relationship Between FHA and Conventional Yields:
The Influence of Risk and Lender Preference
Our new data permit an analysis of changes in the relationship be-
tween FHA and conventional yields over the cycle, and over the
eighteen-year period 1949—66. The dashed line on Chart 4-1, covering
1950—63, shows the differential based on the new National Bureau
series. The solid line covering the period 1949—67 is based on the
FHA secondary market series and the three linked conventional series
used in Chart Table 4-1 shows yield differentials calculated at
specific cycle peaks and troughs in both series. Since the cyclical am-
plitude of FHA yields is sensitive to the prepayment assumption, the
conventional-FHA yield differential in this table is computed on four
different prepayment assumptions.
It would generally be expected that conventionals would carry
higher yields than FHAs because the latter are virtually free of de-
fault risk. The risk on conventional loans made by life insurance corn-
Yieldsin this chart are calculated on a uniform prepayment assumption of















































































































jCONVENTIONAL, FHA AND VA MORTGAGES 65
panies,however, is quite small since these loans typically carry down
payments of 25 per cent or more. (Largely for this reason conven-
tional loans by life insurance companies typically are in the lower
range of yields on conventional loans generally.) For some lenders the
modest risk advantage of FHAs is more than counterbalanced by
other disadvantages. FHA loans have somewhat higher origination
costs because of the need to comply with the insuring agency's report-
ing and other requirements. Higher delinquency ratios on FHAs raise
servicing costs while higher foreclosure ratios are also viewed un-
favorably. While financial loss on foreclosed FHAs is quite small, most
life insurance companies prefer to avoid foreclosure for public relations
and other reasons. In addition, conventional loans may carry prepay-
ment penalties that are attractive to lenders, while borrowers can often
be offered faster processing, and the 1/2 per cent insurance premium is
avoided. The evidence indicates that conventionals have usually yielded
more, but with some notable exceptions.
There are some suggestions in Chart 4-1 and Table 4-1 of a secular
decline in the yield differential over the. period 1952_59.2 Yields de-
clined erratically but persistently over this period. A secular decline
might be expected from the favorable repayment experience on con-
ventional mortgages, which would have reduced their risk premiums
relative to federally underwritten mortgages.3
The yield differential rose during 1950—52, but for very special rea-
sons. With FHA 4.50percent mortgages carrying premiums, the maxi-
mum contract rate on these mortgages was reduced to 4.25percent
in April 1950.Sincepremiums on high-contract-rate mortgages are
never large enough to reduce yields to the level of lower-contract-rate
mortgages (for reasons discussed in the next section), the reduction in
contract rate also reduced FHA yields and raised the yield differential.
The rise in yield differential during this period can be discounted,
therefore, as essentially reflecting an administrative action by the FHA.
This strengthens the case for a secular decline.
The data do not reveal any tendency for the yield differential be-
tween FHA and conventional mortgages to change systematically over
the cycle. Thus, the average differential at the four peaks and three
troughs covered by the authorization data is about the same, as shown
on page 68.
2Asmall part of the decline in yield differential shown in Chart 4-1 may be
due to the fixed prepayment assumption used to calculate yield. See page 154.
An alternative hypothesis is that the liberalization of terms on conventional
mortgages during this period kept pace with the increasingly sanguine views of
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.68 NEW SERIES ON HOME MORTGAGE YIELDS
Prepayment Peak Trough
8 years .00% .05%
10 years .06 .08
Half maturity .09 .08
Maturity .14 .12
However, Chart 4-1 shows that during two periods of extreme credit
stringency—in late 1959—60 and in 1966—the yield differential fell
sharply to a point where FHAs were yielding appreciably more than
conventionals. What could account for this apparent aberration?
The most obvious possibility is a statistical accident arising from
lack of statistical comparability between FHA and conventional series.
The most convincing evidence against this is that the phenomenon ap-
pears in data covering individual lenders, both in 1959 and 1966. It
also appears in data covering individual regions and states.
The conventional loans acquired during a period of market tightness
are of somewhat higher over-all quality than those acquired in more
normal periods, since lenders limit themselves to the best risks. .This
might cause a decline in the yield differential but would not explain
why FHAs come to yield more.4
A third possibility, suggested by market practitioners, is that usury
laws in some states constrained the rise in yields on conventional loans
more than on FHA loans. Discounting on FHAs had become an ac-
cepted practice by 1959, but on conventionals, charges exceeding cus-
tomary levels encounter borrower resistance and various kinds of in-
stitutional frictions.5
If this explanation was correct, we would expect to find rates on
conventional mortgages rising more slowly and the margin between
FHA and conventionalratesincreasing most sharplyinstates
with relatively low usury ceilings. In states with high or no ceil-
ings, in contrast, conventional rates should rise enough to maintain
a margin over FHAs. Data available on a state basis for the 1959—60
period of market stringency do not support this explanation. Table 4-2
The decline would be small in any case, since life insurance companies
change their risk standards on conventional mortgages very little in the short
run.
5Manylenders are reluctant to charge discounts on conventional mortgages
because of adverse public relations arising from complaints by borrowers that
they had been forced to pay a usurious charge in disguise. Under the FHA pro-
gram, only sellers are allowed by law to pay discounts. Even though this re-
quirement is frequently violated by adjusting transactions prices, FHA approval
provides the lender with a prima facie valid defense against the charge that































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.70 NEW SERIES ON HOME MORTGAGE YIELDS
shows that in the two-year period ending in the first quarter of 1960,
rates on conventional loans did not increase any more in three states
with a 10 per cent usury ceiling than in three states with a 6 per cent
ceiling. FHA yields came to exceed conventional yields in both groups
of states, and, in fact, the margin was wider in states with high usury
ceilings.
Many individual lenders must have an institutional preference
for conventionals over FHAs at the same rate. Otherwise, barring
differences in the timing of transactions or other statistical quirks, con-
ventionals could never yield less. Discussions with lenders indicate that
some do indeed prefer conventionals. Such lenders may feel that the
disadvantages of FHA loans more than offset the value of insurance,
particularly on conservative loans where risk is small. As noted earlier,
both origination and servicing costs are somewhat higher on FHA loans
while some lenders are also influenced by the higher rate of foreclosures
on FHAs. Even though the FHA reimburses them, foreclosures involve
a public relations cost which they prefer to avoid. In addition bor-
rowers can be offered faster processing on conventional loans and the
%percent insurance premium is avoided. Also, lenders place some
value on the prepayment restrictions that can be written into con-
ventional loans. Under "normal" market conditions, the impact of
lenders with an institutional preference for FHAs more than offsets
that of lenders with a preference for conventionals, so that conven-
tionals yield more. Lenders who prefer FHAs, however, tend to main-
tain more diversified portfolios and are sensitive to rate differentials
between mortgages and bonds. Under conditions of extreme market
stringency, these lenders tend to shift out of FHA mortgages. The
mortgages must then be absorbed largely by lenders who prefer con-
ventionals and will accept FHAs only at premium rates. Unfortunately,
there is no way at present to test this hypothesis.
Relationship Between FHA and VA Yields:
The Influence of Contract Rate
The relationship between FHA and VA yields is affected by factors
bearing on their relative loan quality, and by their contract rates.
Kiaman noted a tendency for VA yields to be higher (prices to beCONVENTIONAL, FHA AND VA MORTGAGES 71
TABLE 4-3
Discounts on FHA as Compared to VA Mortgages During
Periods of Equal Maximum Contract Rate
National Bureau Series
Average FNMA Series
Contract Rate Average Discount Average Discount
VA less VA less
Period FHAVAFHAVA FHA FHAVA FHA
June-Dec. 1953 4.494.49 .8 1.5 .7 2.2 2.6 .4
1954 4.494.48 .9 1.5 .6 1.1 1.5 .4
1955 4.484.48 1.0 1.7 .7 1.2 1.8 .6
Jan.-Nov. 1956 4.484.49 1.7 2.2 .5 2.2 2.8 .6
1962 5.265.25 3.1 3.4 .3 3.2 3.3 .1
1963 5.255.25 1.9 2.0 .1 2.1 2.1 .0
1964 1.8 1.9 .1
1965 1.9 1.9 .0
1966 6.1 6.1 .0
Note: FNMA quotations apply to 4½ per cent mortgages during 1953 —56,5½ per
cent mortgages during 1962 —65,and 5¼ to 6 per cent mortgages during 1966 (current
rate used in all cases).
lower) during 1953—56 when their maximum contract rates were the
same.6 He noted that
in general, contract terms—maturities, down payments, and loan-to-
value ratios—have been more liberal for VA loans than for FHA loans.
Lenders generally have regarded VA property appraisals also as tending to
be more liberal than those made by FHA. The fact that the VA guarantee
is for 60 per cent of a loan (not to exceed $7,500) and FHA insurance
for 100 per cent of a loan may also have influenced investors' judgments
about the quality of these mortgages.7
Our new data confirm that VA prices were lower (discounts were
larger) during the 1953—56 period of contract rate equality (Table
4-3) •8Suchcomparisons are not possible during the next five years
6Klaman'scomparisons were based on secondary market price quotations
reported by the Federal National Mortgage Association, described above.
Kiaman, The Postwar Residential Mortgage Market, pp. 90, 91.
8Pricesare used in these comparisons because differences in maturities and
expected life as between FHA and VA mortgages over the period covered were
too small to have any significant effect on yield differences.72 NEW SERIES ON HOME 'MORTGAGE YIELDS
because FHA and VA contract rates differed most of the time, but
during 1962—66, contract rates were again the same. In this later
period, the price differential was negligible. This may reflect the fact
that FHA terms became more liberal during the intervening period
relative to VA terms. By 1964, average down payments were only a
few percentage points lower on FHA than on VA mortgages, and FHA
maturities were several years longer. It is possible also that lenders be-
came less concerned with terms during this period.
At various times, FHA mortgages have carried a higher contract
rate than VAs, and this has affected their relative yield. In part, this is
due to the uncertain yield realized on a mortgage that is not priced at
par; the yield depends not only on the contract rate and the size of
the premium or discount but also on the life of the mortgage, which
is not known in advance. Most mortgages are prepaid in full well be-
fore maturity. The more a mortgage deviates from par, the more im-
portant is variability in life as a determinant of realized yield.° Lender
reaction to this uncertainty will affect relative yields.
It is quite possible that lenders will react differently to yield un-
certainty when mortgages sell at premiums than when they sell at dis-
counts from par. When mortgages sell at discounts, yield is a decreasing
function of life, and the lowest possible yield, which is realized if the
mortgage runs to maturity, is not much lower than the yield at some
intermediate "expected" life based on past experience or reasonable
expectations. The maximum yield in this case approaches infinity as
life approaches zero. This is illustrated by the top line in Figure 4-1.
When mortgages carry premiums, on the other hand, yield is an in-
creasing function of life, as illustrated by the lower line on Figure 4-1;
the lowest possible yield approaches minus infinity as life approaches
zero. The maximum yield, which is realized if the mortgage goes to
maturity, is not much higher than the expected yield.
The consequence of miscalculating mortgage life is thus quite dif-
ferent when mortgages sell at premiums than when they sell at dis-
counts. When mortgages carry premiums, an error in the wrong direc-
tion can be very serious, since yield can be zero or negative. If the
market is heavily influenced by conservative lenders, concerned with
the "worst that can happen," the premium paid on high-contract-rate
mortgages may not be large enough to equalize yield with low-contract-
rate mortgages.
9SeeJack M. Guttentag, "Mortgage Interest Rates: Trends and Structure,"
p. 128.CONVENTIONAL, FHA AND VA MORTGAGES 73
FIGURE 4-1
YIELD ON A 5½PERCENT THIRTY-YEAR MORTGAGE
PRICED AT 95 AND 105
When mortgages carry discounts, in contrast, no serious conse-
quences arise from a mistake in estimating mortgage life. Other factors,
however, including public relations aspects of accepting discounts from
borrowers, may influence the yield.1°
The evidence examined here can be divided broadly into two phases,
in which, for periods of varying length, the FHA contract rate was
10Taxtreatment of discounts and premiums does not affect the relative yield of
mortgages carrying different contract rates. For tax purposes, discounts and pre-
miums are considered income rather than capital gains. Typically, the discounts
and premiums of the current year are spread out over a period equal to the esti-
mated life. If the correct estimated life is used to calculate yield and to amortize
discounts and premiums, mortgages with different contract rates carrying the
same before-tax yield will also have the same after-tax yield. If the estimate of
life for tax purposes is, for example, too short, tax payments will be accelerated
but the impact on after-tax yields would be negligible.
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higher than the VA rate. These periods are prior to mid-1952, when
FHAs and VAs carried premiums, and 1957—6 1, when they carried
discounts.
The Case of Premiums
The data11 confirm the supposition advanced above that lenders are
reluctant to pay a premium on a high-contract-rate mortgage large
enough to equalizeitsyield with a lower-contract-rate mortgage.
Prior to April 1950, FHA Section 203 mortgages carried a maximum
rate of 4.50 per cent, while the VA rate was 4 per cent. One large
life insurance company paid an average premium of 0.8 per cent for
VAs during this period and 1.6 per cent for FHAs, producing a yield
spread of .37 per cent in favor of the high-rate FHAs (Table 4-4). To
put the matter somewhat differently, if prepayment occurred in ten
years, which is the assumption used in the yield calculation, FHAs
would have required a premium of about 4.0 points to equalize their
yield with that on VAs.'2 The FHA rate was only .14 per cent below
the conventional rate in this period.
In April 1950, the FHA rate was reduced to 4.25 per cent, and the
yield on FHAs immediately fell relative to VAs and conventionals.
Chart 4-1 shows a sharp rise in the yield differential of conventionals
over FHAs following the rate reduction on FHAs. In the sixteen
months ending April 1952, the FHA yield for life insurance com-
panies was .08 per cent lower than in the prior period, while the yields
on 4 per cent VAs and on conventionals were higher by .15 per cent
and .07 per cent, respectively (see Table 4-4). This shift in the spread
can be attributed largely to the decline in the FHA rate. Nevertheless,
the 4.25 per cent FHAs continued to yield more than 4 per cent VAs.13
It may be asked why, if mortgages carry premiums, the contract
rate is not bid down by competition? The rate set by law or regulation
on FHAs and VAs is, after all, a maximum rate and not a minimum.
Any extended discussion of this would go well beyond the scope of
this paper, but clearly the explanation is rooted in the imperfect char-
11 Publishable data prior to 1951 are limited to one large company. Frag-
mentary data from other sources, however, confirm the relationship shown in
the table.
12 A shorter prepayment period would tend to reduce the yield disparity.
Equal yields, however, imply prepayment in less than two years.
19 After an adjustment for "quality," the spread would have been wider. It

































































































































































































































































































































































































































,NEW SERIES ON HOME MORTGAGE YIELDS
acter of the residential mortgage market at the primary (origination)
level. Among the relevant factors would be the following.
1. Most mortgage borrowers are ignorant of the market and un-
willing or unable to shop.14
2. An apparent sanction is provided the maximum rate by the fed-
eral agencies; borrowers are encouraged to believe that the Government
has set the rate, rather than merely the maximum rate.
3. Mortgage lenders tend to view rate-cutting as an "unethical
practice." One large lender who did cut rates below the maximum in
the period when FHAs carried large premiums was taken severely to
task by other lenders.15 Mortgage lenders tended to view the maximum
allowable rate much as personal finance companies view the legal
rate ceiling on small loans, namely, as a customary rate that is in the
best interest of all lenders to observe.
4. Builders are unwilling to bargain for a lower contract rate; the
builder could usually command part of the premium from the high-
rate mortgage. This might or might not be reflected in lower house
prices.
It would seem from the above analysis that from the standpoint of
borrower interest, contract rates on FHA and VA mortgages should
never be a high enough for these mortgages to command premiums.
As a matter of fact, they have not commanded premiums since 1953.
The CaseofDiscounts
Beginning in 1957, following the 1953—56 period of contract-rate
equality between FHA and VA mortgages, rate differences áróse again.
For this and later periods, price data on FHAs and VAs are available
from FNMA as well as from the new NBER survey. The NBER
data cover loans authorized by large life insurance companies, while
the former are largely based on over-the-counter sales by mortgage
companies, mainly to life insurance companies and mutual savings
banks. The two sources show only modest price differences on FHA
mortgages, but very substantial differences on VAs. Thus, during
February—July 1957, NBER series show VAs carrying a discount of
three points, while the FNMA series show VAs carrying a discount
14Forsome evidence on this, see Housing and Home Finance Agency, "Resi-
dential Mortgage Financing, Jacksonville, Florida, First Six Months of 1950,"
Housing Research Paper No. 23, Washington, D.C., 5 December 1952, pp. 30—33.
15 SeeH. A. Schaaf, "Federal Interest Rate Policy on Insured and Guaranteed
Mortgages," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley,
1955, p. 135.CONVENTIONAL, FHA AND VA MORTGAGES 77
TABLE 4-5
Discounts on FHA and VA Mortgages as Reported in NBER
and FNMA Series, Selected Periods
(percentage points)
NBER FNMA FNMA less NBER
FHA VA FHA VA FHA VA
Feb. 1957-July 1957 2.4 3.0 2.9 7.0 .5 4.0
Oct. 1957-March 1958 '2.3 3.2 2.6 9.2 .3 6.0
Sept. 1958-June 1959 2.5 4.9 3.1 7.2 .6 2.3
Dec. 1959-Jan. 1960 3.4 5.3 3.8 7.9 .4 2.6
Dec. 1960-Jan. 1961 2.9 4.6 2.4 6.6 -.5 2.0
April 1961-Aug.1961 2.6 4.5 2.2 4.3 -.4 -.2
Source: National Bureau of Economic Research, Federal National Mortgage Associa-
tion.
of seven points (Table 4-5). As a result, for the large life insurance
companies, the higher-contract-rate FHAs yielded more, while for the
lenders covered by the, FNMA data, the lower-contract-rate VAs
yielded more (Table 4-6). The yield difference was largest during the
period October '1957—March 1958, when the contract rate difference
between FHAs and VAs was largest (.75 per cent). During this
period, FHAs authorized by the life insurance companies yielded .62
per cent more than VAs, while on loans sold by mortgage companies
FHAs yielded .23 per cent less than VAs.
When VA mortgages carried lower contract rates than FHAs, the
large life insurance companies reduced their VA volume but' took a
limited number at relatively small discounts. This action reflected a
widespread view, in Congress and elsewhere, that large discounts on
VA mortgages were unethical. Kiaman noted that "large financial inter-
mediaries, in their widely acknowledged role as public trustees, have
been less willing to risk public censure than to ignore the facts of mar-
ket forces."6 The result of this policy was, in effect, to create two
markets for VA mortgages: a rationed low-discount market by large
life insurance companies (and perhaps other lenders with similar com-
punctions), and a "free" market where discounts rose to the level nec-
essary to clear the market. It is ironical that the public pressures on
large institutions to limit discounts on VA mortgages, by causing them











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.CONVENTIONAL, FHA AND VA MORTGAGES 79
to sharply reduce their VA volume, had the effect of increasing pres-
sure on VA discounts in the "free" market.
There are indications that life insurance company attitudes toward
discounting underwent a considerable change during 195 8—59, in the
sense that they began to accept the discounts required to bring VA
yields into an appropriate relation to FHA yields. Comparing the
October 1957—March 1958 and the September 1958—June 1959
periods, VA discounts rose by 1.7 points in the NBER series and de-
clined by 2.0 points in the FNMA series (Table 4-5). Perhaps even
more dramatic was the shift in the FHA-VA yield relationship in the
NBER series (Table 4-6). Yields on VA mortgages rose by .48 per
cent as VA discounts rose appreciably despite a rise in contract rate
(4.50 to 4.75 per cent). Yields on FHA mortgages rose by only .02
per cent, as discounts on FHA mortgages of constant contract rate in-
creased only slightly.
Evidently, by 1961, the market had learned to live with discounts.
During April—August 1961, price quotations on VA loans were about
the same in the FNMA and NBER series, and differences between
FHA and VA yields were small. However, the contract-rate difference
between FHAs and VAs was only .25percent during this period; it is
not clear how the market would have reacted to a .75 per cent differ-
ence. Since 1961, contract rates have been the same.
There is, however, additional evidence of a change in lenders' at-
titudes toward discounting during 1959. The evidence consists of
FNMApricequotations, following a change in the FHA or VA maxi-
mum contract rate, on old mortgages carrying the old rate. After the
contract rate is changed, new commitments are at the new rate, but
there will also be some overhang of uncommitted mortgages carrying
the old rate for which mortgage companies or other originators must
find buyers. ENMA continues to report prices on mortgages carrying
the old rate for as long as there is any significant activity in them.
During such periods of dual coverage, yield comparisons are possible
between old and new mortgages carrying different contract rates
(Table 4-7).
These observations reveal a sharp decline during 1959 in the yield
on a low-contract-rate mortgage relative to the yield on a high-contract-
rate mortgage, indicating a greater willingness to accept discounts as an


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































082 NEW SERIES ON HOME MORTGAGE YIELDS
to the maturity and assumed prepayment, the break in 1959 is clearly
evident on any reasonable assumptions.17
Relationship Between Direct, Correspondent and
Secondary Market Yields: The Influence of
Market Organization
In Chapter 3, it was suggested that differences in the cyclical sensitivity
of mortgage and bond yields might be explained in terms of differences
in the organization of the bond and mortgage markets. Here we con-
sider whether cyclical sensitivity is related to differences in substructures
within the mortgage market. We compare direct with correspondent
loans and authorization series with secondary market series.
Direct versus Correspondents Loans
Yields on correspondent loans show a tendency to lag yields on
direct loans as shown in Table 4-8.
Chart 4-2 shows that the direct loan series also contains two short
intracyclical movements (during the second half of 1952 and the first
half of 1957) that follow similar movements in government bond
yields but which do not appear in the correspondent series. Corre-
spondent lending is thus evidently less sensitive; what is the reason?
As noted in Chapter 6, the transfer of a mortgage between life in-
surance company and correspondent is a market transaction rather
than a transfer between agent and principal. Nevertheless, the parties
to the transactions may have a more or less permanent relationship.
The mortgages purchased by the company will be serviced by the cor-
respondent, and, also, the parties to the transaction contemplate addi-
tional transactions in the future. It is not surprising that this continuing
relationship exercises a moderating influence on yield.
1. The life insurance company generally sets a rate at which it will
purchase loans from its correspondents. Although this rate is theoreti-
cally subject to change without notice, frequent changes may be dis-
ruptive to those correspondents who find it necessary to extend their
own commitments before obtaining the life insurance company's com-
mitment. As a result, the companies do not change their buying rate
17Thepartial reversal in 1966 probably reflects the marked slowdown in
mortgage repayments in that year, which could have caused lenders to assume









Lead of Direct Over Correspondent Loans
(number of months)
FHA
with every wiggle in the capital markets. By keeping their buying rate
more stable than the general market around them, they tend to mod-
erate some of the yield changes on correspondent loans.
2. When the life insurance company raises its buying rate and the
correspondent is heavily committed at the old rate the company may
CHART 4-2
GROSS YIELD ON CONVENTIONAL LOANS, 1951-63:
DIRECT VERSUS CORRESPONDENT SERIES













-184. NEWSERIES ON HOME MORTGAGE YIELDS
or may not, as an accommodation,, extend its own commitment at the
same terms as the correspondent's commitment, depending on the
nature of the company-correspondent relationship. The company may
limit this privilege to certain correspondents, perhaps to "good pro-
ducers" operating under allotments. (When the buying rate declines be-
tween the time a correspondent extends its own commitment and the
time it obtains a commitment from the company, the correspondent
might pass the higher yield along, but this probably happens less
often.) A tendency to "bail out" overextended correspondents also
exercises a moderating influence on yield changes.
3. The company may grant a correspondent "precommitment au-
thority," in which the terms in the company's commitment will as a
matter of course hark back to the correspondents' commitment (see
the discussion in Chapter 6).
A company-by-company analysis suggests that the influence on
transactions between company and correspondent of the factors dis-
cussed above varies with the size of the company's correspondent loan
operation. The larger the volume, the more likely that the company
will provide the sole or major outlet for a given correspondent and
the greater the pressure on the company to assure continuity in the
correspondent's operation. This concern may be reflected in any of
the factors discussed above: a relatively stable buying rate, "bail-out"
operations following a rate increase, or delegation of precommitment
authority, all of which tend to generate sluggish yield series. Precom-
mitment authority is, indeed, a formalized expression of the company's
obligation, and it tends to make "bail-out" operations and stable
buying rates unnecessary. Thus, it was found that yield series of one
company, which adopted the policy of granting correspondents pre-
commitment authority at a point during the period covered by our
study, were no more sluggish after this than before. The new policy
merely formalized a behavioral pattern that had existed earlier (and
which had generated sluggish yield series earlier) on an ad hoc basis.
The moderating influence of the correspondent relationship on rates
may be compared with that of the so-called "customer relationship"
between a commercial bank and a business customer who is both de-
positor and borrower.'8 In both cases, transactions are multidimen-
sional, there is a continuing relationship over time, and the relationship
18SeeHodgman, Commercial Bank Loan and Investment Policy, Chapters X
and XI.CONVENTIONAL, FHA AND VA MORTGAGES 85
may cause the lender at times to extend credit at rates below what he
would expect other customers to pay.
Secondary Market versus Authorization Series
The FHAsecondarymarket series19 shows a clear tendency to lead
the combined authorization and correspondent loan series at turning
points (see Table 4_9).20 The evidence on direct loan series at turning
points is not so clear. Although the secondary market series leads at
four of the six turning points, it lags at the other two by substantial
periods. Nevertheless, by the alternative sensitivity measure (yield
changes at specified periods after turning points in long-term govern-
ments), the secondary market series ranks first, the direct loan series
ranks second, and the correspondent loan series ranks third at four
of five turning points (Table 4-10).
The somewhat greater sensitivity of the secondary market series ap-
pears not to be due to residual recording lag in the direct loan series
(see Chapter 7). Presumably, therefore, itis due to differences in
market organization. The secondary market series reflects the activi-
ties of lenders who are not as committed as life insurance companies to
maintaining continuity in the supply of funds, who have no direct
contact with builders or mortgagors, and who cull the market for the
best available deal on any given day. For these reasons, it is likely that
the secondary market series will be more sensitive both to small shifts
in the market equilibrium rate and to factors generating temporary dis-
equilibrium, such as an unforeseen glut that can be moved only at
bargain prices.
Changes in Loan-Value Ratios and Maturities
Although there has been a great deal of theorizing about short-run
changes in nonrate credit terms, which are associated in the literature
19 The secondary market series is based on price quotations compiled by the
Federal Housing Administration, as noted in Chapter 1. Technical differences
between the secondary market series and the authorization series, beyond the
differences in market organization at issue here, are discussed in Chapter 9.
These differences probably do not affect the relative cyclical behavior of the
series.
20 The early-1951 trough, which is used in Table 4-1 and elsewhere in this
study, cannot be employed with confidence here because the turning point in the
direct and correspondent loan series may have occurred before January 1951,






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.88 NEW SERIES ON HOME MORTGAGE YIELDS
with changes in credit rationing and "availability,"21 little has been
known about the actual behavior of terms over time because of the
sparsity of data. Only for VA mortgages had there been monthly
series over any extended period, and these loans comprised a pro-
gressively diminishing share of the total residential market.22 Our new
data provide insight into the behavior of loan-value ratios and ma-
turities on all three types of mortgages, although for only one major
lender group.
1. Secular Change. Loan-value ratios have risen and maturities have
lengthened on both federally underwritten (particularly FHA) and con-
ventional mortgages throughout the period since World War II. On
federally underwritten loans, the main factor underlying the trend has
been legislative liberalization of maximum allowable terms. On con-
ventional loans, legal limits have been liberalized for some lenders and
favorable repayment experience has encouraged them to use the new
authority. Herzog and Earley have extensively documented this change
and so it will not be examined in detail here.23
During 195 1—63 the large life insurance companies in our series
lengthened considerably the maturities on all three types of mortgages,
and kept pace with the lengthening done by other lenders (see Table
4-11). In contrast, loan-value ratios on conventional loans by life in-
surance companies did not rise as much as they did on conventional
loans by savings and loan associations. (This probably reflects the
greater constraint of legal ceilings on life insurance companies; none
of the four companies in our survey could go above 75 per cent,
whereas after 1958, federally charted savings and loan associations
could under certain conditions go as high as 90 per cent.) Loan-value
ratios on VA loans by life insurance companies didn't rise much either,
but these ratios were very high at the beginning of the period. Only on
FHA loans did the rise in loan-value ratios for life insurance com-
panies keep pace with the rise for other lenders.
2. Cyclical Changes. Cyclical changes in terms are affected by
changes in supply and demand for mortgage credit and by changes in
21.SeeJack Guttentag, "Credit Availability,Interest Rates, and Monetary
Policy," Southern Economic Journal, January 1960; and Richard F. Muth, "In-
terest Rates, Contract Terms, and the Allocation of Mortgage Funds," The
Journal of Finance, March 1962.
22 A series on VA downpayments is shown in Guttentag, "The Short Cycle in
Residential Construction, 1946—59," p. 282; and in Leo Grebler, Housing issues
in Economic Stabilization Policy, pp. 118—120.
23 John P. Herzog and James S. Earley, Home Mortgage Delinquency and




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.90 NEW SERIES ON HOME MORTGAGE YIELDS
legal lending limits imposed on institutional lenders, which were quite
important in the 195 1—63 period. The secular changes already re-
ferred to must be accounted for in any interpretation of cyclical
changes.
Mainly we will focus on the relationship between changes in terms
and changes in yields. Terms are usually believed to change in such a
way as to reinforce the effect on demand of changes in rates, i.e., when
yields fall, loan-value ratios rise, maturities lengthen, and so on. Two
hypotheses have been advanced to support this expectation. One, the
"credit-rationing" hypothesis, assumes that shifts in lenders' loan-offer
functions involve changes in both rates and terms. When lenders have
more money to lend, they will offer lower rates and higher loan-value
ratios.24 An alternative hypothesis focuses on changes in borrower mix
at different interest rate levels. This hypothesis assumes that loan-offer
functions change only with respect to rates. Changes in rates, however,
change the composition of demand among borrowers with different
preferences for using borrowed funds. Thus, if lenders have more
funds to lend and reduce rates, borrowers with high loan-value and long
maturity preferences are attracted into the market and average terms
become more liberal.25
In general, the evidence covering life insurance companies during
1951—63 is consistent with the expectations arising from the two
hypotheses.
1. On conventional loans, maturities rose during periods of rising
yields as well as during periods of falling yields, but they rose at a much
fasterrate during periodsof declining yields 26(Chart 4-3 and
24. See Guttentag, "Credit Availability,..
See Muth. Note that both hypotheses offer the possibility of terms moving
to offset rather than reinforce changes in rates under certain conditions (where
changes in demand are the principal dynamic factor in the market). Under the
Guttentag version of the credit-rationing hypothesis, such an offsetting move-
ment can occur if changes in demand are so large that they cause a pronounced
shift in lender's risk functions—that is,in the risk premium associated with
loans having given characteristics. Under the Muth hypothesis, an offsetting
movement can occur if demand changes result from a shift in the marginal
returns schedule of potential borrowers arising from any factor affecting the
demand for owner-occupied housing. Guttentag, although not necessarily Muth,
views the offsetting case as atypical.
2G The liberalization of terms on conventional loans during the 195 1—54 period
of rising yields may have been affected by relaxation of credit controls under
Regulation X. As shown on the chart, these relaxations occurred in September
1951, June 1952 (on loan-value ratios only), and September 1952 (when theCONVENTIONAL, FHA AND VA MORTGAGES 91
CHART 4-3
LOAN-VALUE RATIO AND MATURITY ON
CONVENTIONAL LOANS, 1951-63
(THREE-MONTHS AVERAGE)
Table 3-2). A pronounced cyclical pattern appears after adjustment for
trend, as shown in Chart 4-4. There is hardly any cyclical pattern at
all in loan-value ratios, probably because of the dampening influence of
low ceilings.27
In April 1959, the maximum loan-value ratio on conventional loans
was raised from 66% per cent to 75percent, and the maximum ma-
turity was extended from twenty-five to thirty years for two of the
companies in our survey. This was a period of rapidly rising yields
and increasing tightness in the capital markets. The extension of ma-
regulation was suspended). The effect probably was quite small, however, be-
cause most conventional loans made by life insurance companies prior to Regu-
lation X fell within the limits of the regulation.
27 Loan-value ratios may be subject to bias arising from discrepancies be-
tween appraised values and sales prices. If, e.g., lenders are "conservative" in
raising appraised values during a period of rising construction and prices, loan-
value ratios will rise less than loan-price ratios.Itis not clear whether this
factor is of any real importance.92 NEW SERIES ON HOME MORTGAGE YIELDS
MATURITY ON
CHART 4-4
CONVENTIONAL LOANS AS PER CENT OF
TREND, 1951—63
(THREE-MONTHS AVERAGE)
turity had no noticeable effect since the existing twenty-five-year limit
was within the range of maturities generally available in the market at
the time. The loan-value ratio, however, immediately reflected the in-
crease in the limit because the existing 66% limit was well below the
loan ratios available from savings and loan associations.
2. Maturities and loan-value ratios on. FHAloanswere strongly
affected by the very frequent changes in legal maximum terms that
occurred during the 1951—63 period. As indicated in Chart 4-5,hardly
any cyclical phase does not include some such change. Little can be
said, therefore, about the cyclical behavior of terms on FHA mortgages
in response to market forces alone.
3. In contrast to FHAandconventional loans, terms on VA mort-
gages show a rough cyclical pattern: liberalization during periods of
declining yields and restriction during periods of rising yields (Chart
4-6). Maximum allowable terms on VA loans were also revised, al-
though not as frequently as on FHA loans, and the VA sample is thin
during certain periods. Nevertheless, allowing forrn these influences does
NOTE: Shaded areas are periods of declining yields.CONVENTIONAL, FHA AND VA MORTGAGES 93
LOAN-VALUE
CHART 4-5










NOTE: Shaded areas are periods of declining yields. In 1957, the relaxation
of legal limits applies only to the loan-value ratio; in 1961, it applies to both
loan-value ratio and maturity.
not change the conclusion. An important exception, however, is the
1960—63 period of yield decline when loan-value ratios declined and
maturities were roughly level.
4. Chart 4-7 shows quite marked cyclical fluctuations in weighted
average loan-value ratios and maturities on all mortgages; much of
this variability was due to shifts in the mix. Table 4-12 shows actual
cyclical changes in average loan-value ratios and maturities on all
mortgages, and changes calculated on an assumption of constant corn-
position.28 The difference in peak-trough changes using actual and
28 Each peak-trough change is calculated on the assumption that the com-
position at the trough is the same as at the peak, and each trough-peak change
is calculated on the assumption that the composition at the peak is the same
as at the trough.94 NEW SERIES ON HOME MORTGAGE YIELDS
CHART 4-6






constant weights thus shows the effect of changes in mix during that
phase. As an example, the average maturity declined by .9.0 months
during the 1951—54 rise in yield, but since the decline would have been
only 1.2 months if composition had not changed, the difference, or
7.8, was due to a shift in mix.
Changes in mix were in the direction of tightening credit during
each of the three periods of rise in yields, although in the 1958—60
period, the shift was not large enough to offset the easing that occurred
separately on each type of mortgage. Shifts in mixwerein the direction
of easing in the first two periods of yield decline but not in the third
(1960—63) period. Thus, shifts in mix usually but not invariably re-
inforced the effects of changes in yields.
Therefore, the evidence covering life insurance companies is broadly
consistent with the hypothesis that over the cycle, terms will move to
reinforce the effect of yields, but this pattern can be suppressed or dis-
S S 5380
S 350
NOTE: Shaded areas are periods of declining yields.CONVENTIONAL, FHA AND VA MORTGAGES 95
CHART4-7
LOAN-VALUE RATIO AND MATURITY ON ALL
RESIDENTIAL LOANS, 1951-63
(THREE-MONTHS AVERAGE)
rupted by a number of influences. Thus, the expected cyclical changes
in terms were constrained on conventional mortgages by relatively low
legal ceilings on loan-value ratios, and by the thrust of secular lib-
eralization on maturities; the expected pattern on FHA mortgages was
disrupted by frequent changes in legal ceilings on both loan-value
ratios and maturities. The expected pattern revealed itself on VA mort-
gages but, during part of the 1961—63 period, the life insurance com-
panies were virtually out of this market. Shifts in the mix of the three
types of mortgages usually changed average terms in the expected direc-
tion, sometimes by a substantial amount.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Yields on Bonds and Mortgages at Reference Cycle Peaks and Troughs
Peaks
July 1953 July 1957 May 1960 Average
Mortgages
Conventional 4.76 5.48 6.09
FHA 4.53 5.38 6.28
Cony, less FHA .23 .10 -.17 .05
Bonds
Corporate Baa 3.86 4.73 5.28
Corporate Aaa 3.28 3.99 4.46
Baa less Aaa .58 .74 .82 .71
State and local Baa 3.60 4.29 4.31
State and local Aaa 2.56 3.17 3.34
BaalessAaa 1.04 1.12 .97 1.04
Conventional mortgages
Less Aaa corporate bonds 1.48 1.49 1.63 1.53
Less Aaa state and
local 2.20 2.31 2.75 2.42
Troughs
Aug. 1954 April 1958 Feb. 1961 Average
Mortgages
Conventional 4.74 5.63 5.96
FHA 4.60 5.61 6.16
Cony, less FHA .14 .02 -.20 -.01
Bonds
Corporate Baa 3.49 4.67 5.07
Corporate Aaa 2.87 3.60 4.27
Baa less Aaa .62 1.07 .80 .83
State and local Baa 2.94 3.78 4.06
State and local Aaa 1.90 2.70 3.14
Baa less Aaa 1.04 1.08 .92 1.01
Conventional mortgages
Less Aaa corporate bonds 1.87 2.03 1.69 1.86
Less Aaa state and
local 2.84 2.93 2.82 2.86
Note: Mortgage yields are from NBER authàrization series, with assumed prepay-
ment of ten years. Bond series are from Moody's.